Abstract. Two preimputations of a given TU game can be compared via the Lorenz order applied to the vectors of satisfactions. One preimputation is socially more desirable' than the other, if its corresponding vector of satisfactions Lorenz dominates the satisfaction vector with respect to the second preimputation. It is shown that the prenucleolus, the anti-prenucleolus, and the modi®ed nucleolus are maximal in this Lorenz order. Here the modi®ed nucleolus is the unique preimputation which lexicographically minimizes the envies between the coalitions, i.e. the dierences of excesses. Recently SudhoÈ lter developed this solution concept. Properties of the set of all undominated preimputations, the maximal satisfaction solution, are discussed. A function on the set of preimputations is called collective satisfaction function if it respects the Lorenz order. We prove that both classical nucleoli are unique minimizers of certain`weighted Gini inequality indices', which are derived from some collective satisfaction functions. For the (pre)nucleolus the function proposed by Kohlberg, who characterized the nucleolus as a solution of a single minimization problem, can be chosen. Finally, a collective satisfaction function is de®ned such that the modi®ed nucleolus is its unique maximizer.
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Introduction
Symmetry and fairness are among the basic tenets of the theory of solutions of cooperative games since its creation by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) . Symmetry roughly means that a solution of a game must be invariant under the (linear transformations induced by the) symmetries of the game.
(More general formulations are possible.) Fairness, or equal treatment, requires that at each point of the solution symmetric players receive equal payos. However, considerations of equity were not used to justify solutions of transferable utility (TU) games till the introduction of the nucleolus in Schmeidler (1969) .
Schmeidler considered the distribution of excesses of coalitions (relative to a feasible payo vector), and chose the feasible payo vector that yields the minimum distribution (in the lexicographic order). Although Schmeidler was motivated by equity considerations, his approach is ad hoc and is not directly related to standard concepts of the theory of inequality (in economics). Indeed, Maschler (1992) writes on the de®nition of the nucleolus:`M athematicians will certainly admire the above de®nition, but can it be given a convincing intuitive meaning? Here is an attempt [Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1979) ]. Consider an arbitrator, whom the players ask to decide how to share vx . The arbitrator may regard the excess of a coalition as a measure of dissatisfaction and he may be eager to decrease the excesses of the various coalitions as much as possible. This will also increase``stability''. He will then look for payos in which the highest excess is as low as possible. If there is more than one such payo, he will tell the highest-excess coalitions:``I have helped you as much as I could, but I can still help other coalitions.'' He will then proceed to choose outcomes for which the second highest excess is minimal, and so on. Obviously, such``justi®cation'' raises more questions than it answers. What is more``stable'', a situation in which a few coalitions of highest excess have it as low as possible, or one where such coalitions have a slightly higher excess, but the excesses of many other coalitions are substantially lowered? It is the lexicographic order that is hard to motivate.'' Our paper addresses the foregoing questions raised by Maschler using the standard tools of equity theory. Let v be a TU game. With each preimputation of v (i.e., a Pareto optimal payo vector) we associate the distribution of satisfactions of all the coalitions (the satisfaction of a coalition is the negative of its excess). We now compare preimputations by (partially) ordering their distributions of satisfactions by Lorenz domination. Our solution, the maximal satisfaction solution Mv, consists of the set of all preimputations whose distribution of satisfactions is maximal (i.e., it is not Lorenz dominated). It cannot be criticized in the foregoing manner, because it contains all equitable payos. Nonemptiness of Mv is easily proved. We now brie¯y review the contents of the paper.
First we show that MÁ has several standard properties: equal treatment, desirability, covariance, self duality (i.e., Mv Mv Ã for each TU game v, where v Ã is the dual of v), (strong) null player, and (two-sided) reasonableness. A second goal is to determine the structure of Mv for each v. For this purpose we ®rst obtain a geometric characterization of the points in Mv (see Theorem 2.2). Then we prove that Mv is a contractible union of a ®nite number of polytopes. Mv is also a continuous function of the game v.
It is easily shown that the prenucleolus, the anti-prenucleolus, and the modi®ed nucleolus are members of M. Moreover, it follows from Kohlberg (1972) that the prenucleolus is the unique minimizer of some weighted Gini index. (We oer a purely geometric proof of this result (see Remark 3.3).) Kohlberg's result can be generalized to the modi®ed nucleolus and the antiprenucleolus. In the Appendix we give a new proof of Kohlberg's result. Our proof enables us to explicitly estimate the coecients of Kohlberg's collective satisfaction function.
This ®rst study of the maximal satisfaction solution leaves open many problems. We shall only mention one: To ®nd a suitable axiomatization of MÁ.
De®nitions and preliminary results
A cooperative game with transferable utility ± a game ± is a pair q xY v, where x is a ®nite nonvoid set and
is a mapping. Here 2 x f xg is the set of coalitions of q. If q xY v is a game, then x is the grand coalition or the set of players and v is called coalitional (or characteristic) function of q. Since the nature of q is determined by the coalitional function, v is called game as well.
If q xY v is a game, then the dual game x Y v Ã of q is de®ned by
for all coalitions . The set of feasible payo vectors of q is denoted by
is the set of preimputations of q (also called set of Pareto optimal feasible payos of q). Here x R iP x i xY 0 for each x P x and x . Additionally, let x s denote the restriction of x to , i.e.
x x i iP P Y whereas e fx s j x P eg for e x . For disjoint coalitions Y x and x P x let x Y x x . A solution concept r on a set C of games is a mapping that associates with every game v P C a set of rv
C is a subset of C, then the canonical restriction of a solution concept r on C is a solution concept on " C. We say that r is a solution concept on " C, too. If C is not speci®ed, then r is a solution concept on every set of games.
Some convenient and well-known properties of a solution concept r on a set C of games are as follows.
(1) r is anonymous (satis®es AN), if for each x Y v P C and each bijective mapping
In this case v and sv are equivalent games. (2) r satis®es the equal treatment property (ETP), if for every x P rx Y v v P C interchangeable players iY j P x are treated equally, i.e. 
Note that both equivalence and strategic equivalence commute with duality, i.e. sv Ã sv Ã Y av b Ã av Ã b, where sY aY b are chosen according to the de®nitions given above. With the help of assertion (9b) Milnor (1952) de®ned his notion of reasonableness.
It should be remarked (see Shapley (1953) ) that the Shapley value u (to be more precise the solution concept r given by rv fuvg satis®es all above properties. Moreover, it is well-known that the Shapley value of a game and its dual cannot be distinguished. This observation motivates the following De®nition 1.1 A solution concept r on a set C of games is self dual (satis®es SD), if rv rv Ã whenever vY v Ã P C.
Some more notation will be needed. Let x Y v be a game and x P x . The excess of a coalition x at x is the real number
The satisfaction of a coalition at x is the negative excess of , denoted by
To a`utility' vector x P x its Lorenz curve vx y P n , where n jxj, de®ned by y k minfx j x and j j kg for k P f1Y F F F Y ngY is attached. If the points kY v k x are plotted and consecutive points kY v k xY k 1Y v k1 x are connected by a line segment, then a curve is obtained (see Fig. 4.1) . A collective utility function is a continuous mapping X x 3 which satis®es (1) Anonymity: x y, if x arises from y by a permutation of the components, and (2) Unanimity: x ! y, if x ! y, and x b yY if x i b y i for i P x for xY y P x .
To simplify notation we de®ne x to be the vector which arises from x by ordering the components of x nondecreasingly, i.e. In order to compare feasible payo vectors of a game in terms of their satisfaction vectors it is sucient to replace`utility' by`satisfaction'. The formal notion is given in Note that x weakly dominates y via satisfaction w.r.t.
for every k 1Y F F F Y 2 n and every subset S 2 x with jSj k. Moreover, x dominates y, if additionally one of the equations (1.1) is strict. q.e.d.
In order to show that the set of vectors which weakly dominate x intersects Mv we recall the de®nition of a nucleolus. For x the nucleolus of v w.r.t. X is the set N Y v of vectors in X which lexicographically minimize the nonincreasingly ordered vector of excesses, i.e.
where qx f Y xY v x . Schmeidler (1969) showed that nonemptiness together with compactness of X implies nonemptiness of the nucleolus, whereas convexity of X implies that N Y v contains at most one element. Proof: It is straightforward to verify AN and COV. ETP is a direct consequence of DES. Therefore it is sucient to show PO, DES, and SD.
(5) Let x Y v P C and x P Ã v. If x is not a preimputation, then there exists b 0 such that y, de®ned by y i x i for i P x belongs to Ã v. Clearly f Y xY v`f Y yY v for Y T x holds true, thus y dominates x via satisfaction. Note that can be chosen in such a way that y is a preimputation. (3) In view of Pareto optimality which is established for M we assume that x P v. Take iY j P x and assume that i is at least as desirable as j. If x i`xj , take b 0 such that y, de®ned by 
is true by Pareto optimality (see (5)). Assume, on the contrary, there is y P Ã v Ã which dominates x via satisfaction w.r.t. v Ã . Then y can be assumed to be Pareto optimal w.r.t. v Ã and, hence, w.r.t. v. Equation 1.2 together with the fact that the sum of all satisfactions is constant on the set of preimputations shows that y 1 v x (because
(where v 0 Á 0 by convention) is true for z P v, thus a contradiction is established. q.e.d.
Though we have seen that the nucleolus of v w.r.t. the set of elements which weakly dominate x (for every feasible payo vector x of v) via satisfaction is a singleton contained in the set of undominated preimputations it should be noted that both the prenucleolus N Ã vY v fmvg as well as the antinucleolus m Ã v mv Ã of v are members of the maximal satisfaction solution Mv. Indeed, mv must be a member of the maximal satisfaction solution applied to v, which can be seen directly, whereas the antinucleolus must be a member of Mv by Lemma 1.5 (6).
Remark 1.6
(1) Note that the maximal satisfaction solution is a standard solution which means that for 2-person games x Y v, let us say x fiY jg, the only member of Mv assigns vfig À vfjg vx a2 to player i. xiY yY i , and gy imply this property. (2) In what follows an example is presented which simultaneously shows that Mv is not necessarily convex (though it is a ®nite union of polytopes as proved in the next section) and does not necessarily contain the Shapley value. To this end let x Y v be de®ned by x f1Y F F F Y 4g and
With the help of Kohlberg's (1971) characterization of the prenucleolus by balanced collections of coalitions it can easily be checked that
Moreover, the Shapley value can be computed as uv 1Y À1Y 5Y 7. The veri®cation that 1Y À1Y 6Y 6 1 v uv and (0,0,6,6) 1 v mv m Ã va2 is straightforward and left to the reader. 
Then the maximal satisfaction solution is a singleton consisting of the unique vector (6, 3, 3) (which is simultaneously the nucleolus, the anti-prenucleolus, and the Shapley value), whereas the egalitarian solution is the`equal split' vector (4, 4, 4).
Characterizations of the maximal satisfaction solution
This section serves to present characterizations of Mv which allow many applications. Indeed, as a byproduct we show that this solution concept satis®es the strong nullplayer property which can be used to verify REAS. Moreover, Mv turns out to be a contractible ®nite union of compact polytopes. Some notation is needed. During this section let N be a ®nite set of at least two elements. Recall that a ®nite set x is balanced, if it possesses balancing coecients d x xP , i.e.
De®nition 2.1 Let x Y v be a game and x P Ã v.
(1) A ®nite sequence G G j r j1 of collections of coalitions is a con®guration of N, if
The preimputation x of v maximizes satisfaction, if and only if the induced con®guration GxY v is feasible.
This Theorem is a direct consequence of the duality theorem of linear programming and the following Lemma 2.3 Let x P v for some game x Y v and fy P x j yx 0 nd y Á z ! 0 for every z P GxY vgX (Here x Á y denotes the scalar product of x and y.) Then x P Mv, if and only if f0Y F F F Y 0g.
(1) In order to show that f0Y F F F Y 0g implies x P Mv, assume there is a preimputation x P vnMv, which does not maximize satisfaction, and choose some preimputation x H P v satisfying x H 1 v x; thus x H T x is valid. It remains to show that x H À x is a member of . For
inequality (1.1) (applied to x H and x instead of x and y) implies 
k of cardinality k of coalitions. The collections S k can be chosen in an increasingly ordered way, i.e.
holds true by (2.1). Moreover, in view of the de®nition of GxY v, there is a number t k and a set T k G t k 1 xY v of coalitions satisfying
The fact that the vectors z k span the Euclidean space is a straight-forward consequence of (2.2). Therefore yz k b 0 for some k by y T 0, thus x 1 v x is satis®ed. q.e.d.
Remark 2.4
(1) Similarly to Part (1) of the preceding proof we can show that if x " v y for some preimputations x and y of v, then y À x Á z ! 0 for every z P GxY v, thus y À x P , where is de®ned in Lemma 2.3.
DxY v satis®es y T x, then y À x P by (1). However, in view of Lemma 2.3, T f0Y F F F Y 0g is impossible for x P Mv.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Let be de®ned as in Lemma 2.3 and put G GxY v. Then the following conditions are equivalent by the just mentioned lemma.
is feasible and its value is 0. The dual program of P reads
and, thus, x P Mv implies the existence of vectors b z Y b x with the above properties. As 1 b z b 0 we know that b x must be positive in this case. We conclude that d z 1 b z ab x are balancing coecients. It remains to show the converse direction of our assertion. If the con®guration G is feasible, take balancing coecients d z b 0 for z P G and observe that b z zP G together with b x de®ned by b z ad z À 1 and b x a, where a 1a minfd z j z P Gg, constitute a feasible and hence optimal solution (with value 0) of the dual programm of P. The duality theorem and the last lemma complete the proof of this direction.
q.e.d.
is a re®nement of the con®guration H H i t i1 Y if every component of H is the union of consecutive components of GY i.e.
We will show that a con®guration H is feasible, if and only if it possesses a feasible re®nement G. Indeed, every con®guration is a re®nement of itself. For the converse implication, let G be feasible. With the help of a recursive argument, it is sucient to show this assertion for r t 1, i.e., if
j and H j G j for j`" j. In this case we have
which shows that the sum of vectors in H which may not be in G can be expressed as a linear combination of elements of G, i.e. which by Remark 2.5 and Theorem 2.2 is a subset of Mv. Conversely, the just mentioned theorem implies that GxY v is feasible for x P Mv. The number of (feasible) con®gurations is ®nite, thus the proof is ®nished.q.e.d.
We would like to apply these characterizing results to show that the maximal satisfaction solution satis®es reasonableness. First of all we show that the solution satis®es the strong nullplayer property (for single valued solution concepts also known as`nullplayer out property' (see Derks and Haller 1995) ) in the sense of the following De®nition 2.7 A solution concept r on a set C of games satis®es the strong nullplayer property (SNPP), if for every game x Y v P C and every nullplayer i P x of v the following condition is satis®ed: If x nfigY w PCis the subgame of v which arises from v by deleting i, then rv arises from rw by adding a zero component for player i to every element of rw, i.e.
Note that SNPP implies NPP. Moreover, it should be remarked that many solution concepts (e.g. the Shapley value, Core, and the nucleoli) satisfy even the stronger property.
Remark
Theorem 2.9
The maximal satisfaction solution M satis®es SNPP.
Proof. For one-person games the solution satis®es NPP because of PO. Let x Y v be a game, i be a nullplayer of v, and x P v. In order to show that z i 0 for z P Mv two cases are distinguished.
(1) x i`0 : The smallest satisfaction is only attained by coalitions x which contain player i. Moreover, by PO and the fact f figY xY v`0 such coalitions cannot coincide with the grand coalition x . Take any coalition of minimal satisfaction and j P x n. Using the above observation and the fact that f Y xY v`f nfigY xY v for all coalitions x with i P it is clear that z i ! z j for every z P GxY v. Moreover, the inequality is strict for at least one z. Therefore x j P Mv by Remark 2.8. (2) The case x i b 0 can be treated analogously. Indeed, a coalition which attains minimal satisfaction does neither contain i nor coincides with the empty set, because f x nfigY xY v`0. Moreover, f figY xY v b f Y xY v for x nfig. Therefore z i z j for z P GxY v and j P . Consequently x j P Mv by Remark 2.8.
It remains to show that Mv fx P
x j x i 0 and x x nfigiPMwgY where x nfigY w is the subgame of v.
(1) This inclusion is trivial for jx j 2, thus we assume that x possesses at least three members. Let x P Mv, thus x i 0 by NPP, and de®nẽ x x x nfig . Takeỹ P x nfig which satis®esỹx nfig 0 andỹ Á z ! 0 for z P GxY w. With y ỹY 0 P x we come with yx 0 and y Á z ! 0 for z P GxY v. Indeed, if
(Note that 1 in equation (2.5) is considered to be a vector of x , whereas in the second equation (2.6) it is considered to be in x nfig .) With T f xnfig j P TgY T 0 f PT j P T Q figg, and T 1 TnT 0 we haveTY T 0 Y T 1 G k1 xY w and we obtain jG j xY wj jTj and observe that z P GxY v holds true. This shows that y x nfig Àx Áz ! 0 is valid. Clearly, y x nfig Àx T 0 and, thus, Lemma 2.3 ®n-ishes the proof of this inclusion. q.e.d.
Theorem 2.10
The maximal satisfaction solution is reasonable.
Proof. Assume, on the contrary, M does not satisfy REAS on some set C of games. Let x Y v P C be a game and x P Mv, such that there exists i P x with
By COV we can assume that d i 0 holds true. Let j j P x and de®ne x fjgY u to be the game which arises from v by adding one nullplayer j. By the SNPP y xY 0 P Mu, but y i`di 0 y j which contradicts DES. q.e.d. is a homeomorphism (because Mv is compact). Let h fz P 2n j there is a P g such that ! zg X Then h is closed and convex (because the component functions h k are concave) and g is the set of Pareto optimal points of h. Theorem 4.6 of Peleg (1972) directly implies that g is contractible. Therefore Mv is contractible, because h is a homeomorphism. q.e.d.
Theorem 2.12 Mv is a continuous function of v.
Proof.
(1) Lower hemicontinuity: Let v k kPx be a sequence of games on x with lim k3I v k v and let x P Mv. Choose 
Thus, by Remark 2.4, y x.
(2) Upper hemicontinuity: Let lim k3I v k vY x k P Mv k Y k P x, and lim k3I x k x. Without loss of generality we can assume that Gx k Y v k G for every k P x. By Theorem 2.2 G is feasible and, clearly, it is a re®nement of GxY vX By Remark 2.5 GxY v is feasible. Therefore by Theorem 2.2 x P MvX q.e.d.
The nucleolus as the unique minimizer of a weighted Gini index
In this section we ®x a ®nite nonvoid set x and denote the set of games with player set x by C fxY v j v is a gamegX De®nition 3.1 A function X x Â C 3 is a collective satisfaction function reducing inequality, if there exists a collective utility function X holds true for x P x and v P C. We are going to show that there is a collective satisfaction function reducing inequality such that the nucleolus (pre-or antinucleolus respectively) is the unique maximizer of ÁY v restricted to the set of feasible payos Ã v of v. Moreover, it will be shown that can be chosen in such a way that the induced inequality index is a weighted Gini index.
Recall (see Kolm (1966) and Atkinson (1970) ) that a collective utility function X x 3 reducing inequality induces an inequality indexX x !y nf0g 3 , de®ned by
where ax P b0 is the unique real number satisfying ax Á 1 x xX (Recall that W is assumed to be continuous.) An inequality index G satis®es qx`qy for xY y P x !0 nf0g with xx yx whenever x Lorenz dominates y.
In case
i.e.
the induced inequality index is the Gini index. It takes the surface between thè straight line', i.e. the Lorenz curve of the`equal treatment vector' xx Y Á Á Á Y xxan, and the Lorenz curve of x as a measure of inequality of x. Indeed, note that (3.3) can be rewritten as
For this notation Moulin (1988) is referred to. Every strictly decreasing ®nite sequence p p 1 Y F F F Y p n of positive real numbers with total weight 1, i.e.
(p is called descending probability on f1Y F F F Y ng de®nes a collective utility function p X x 3 analogously to (3.2) by
By the nonincreasingness and positivity of p the collective utility function p reduces inequality. The induced inequality index q p is a weighted Gini index (cf. SudhoÈ lter 1996b). The dierence between the`classical' Gini index and a weighted Gini index can be seen by looking at the formula
3X6
Therefore q p puts weight p i À p i1 to i. The Gini index is proportional to the surface between the straight line and the Lorenz curve (i.e. the Gini index G is a special weighted index such that consecutive weights are equidistant), whereas q p`d istorts' the axis before measuring the surface. Figure 3 .1 sketches the Lorenz curves and the`distorted' Lorenz curves of x 2Y 2Y 14 and y 0Y 9Y 9 where p 6Y 2Y 1a9. In this case q p puts larger weights tò poorer people'. Indeed, the horizontal distances between consecutive players in the left part of the ®gure (which sketches the`classical' Gini index) are equal, whereas the horizontal distance between i and i 1 in the right part of the ®gure (which sketches q p ) is proportional to p i À p i1 . In this example qx b qy and q p x`q p y. Unfortunately the de®nition of inequality indices cannot directly be generalized to utility pro®les which possess negative entries. In our situation we would like to have the notion of inequality indices for satisfaction vectors. As the interest is mainly restricted to preimputations the normalization factor`naxx ' can be dropped in formula 3.6. Therefore we will frequently replace equation 3.6 by
from now on. Here " f xY v 1a2 n Á x f Y xY v. Moreover, for every descending probability p P
where Every b 1 determines a descending probability p p P 2 n by
There is a 0 ! 1 such that for every b 0 the prenucleolus is the unique maximizer of p , i.e.
argmaxf p xY v j x P Ã vg fmvg 3X9
for every v P C.
This theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.1 of Kohlberg (1972) . Indeed, note that Kohlberg's assumption of zero-normalized games is not needed in his proofs, and can, thus, be dropped. Moreover, it should be remarked that in view of Lemma 1.5 and Theorem 2.10 equation 3.9 can be replaced by argmax f p xY v j x P g fmvgY 3X10
for every set v satisfying fx P v j x is reasonableg. By COV of M and m we can assume without loss of generality that vx 0 and that the marginal contributions of every player are bounded by À1 from below and 1 from above, i.e.
À1 v fig À v 1 for x nfig and i P x is satis®ed. Therefore fx P x j xx 0 and À1 x i 1 for i P x g possesses the desired properties. As X is a polytope Kohlberg's result applies.
Hence h k Á is a polyhedral concave function for each k. As in the proof of Theorem 2.11 let h fz P 2 n j there is x P Mv suh tht hx ! zgX Then D is a polyhedral convex set whose set of Pareto optimal points is g hMv. It is easily veri®ed that the (®nite) set of extreme points of D is contained in C. A point z P g is exposed, if it is extreme (because D is polyhedral). Thus, a point x P Mv is the unique maximizer of a collective satisfaction function of the form
Thus hmv is an extreme point of D (this can also be veri®ed directly from the de®nitions of m and D; notice that hmv is the lexicographic maximum of D).
In order to obtain a similar result for the antinucleolus de®ne for every descending probability p P 2 n the dual vector p Ã P 2 n by
and note that p Ã is a descending probability in 2 n .
Theorem 3.4
There is a 0 ! 1 such that for every b 0 the antinucleolus is the unique maximizer of p Ã , i.e.
Proof. By Lemma 1.5 equation 3.11 is equivalent to
and, hence, to
With the help of equation 3.5, p i xY v as de®ned in formula 3.8, and q p Ã we come up with
The second equality is guaranteed by
. Therefore equation 3.13 is equivalent to
which is valid by Theorem 3.2 for c large enough. q.e.d.
Note that
. Therefore Theorem 3.2 and 3.4 can be reformulated in terms of weighted Gini indices. Let q
Corollary 3.5 There exists 0 ! 1 such that for every b 0 and every v P C
Intuitively, q m puts exponentially larger weights to larger aggregate excesses (i.e. smaller satisfactions play a`dominant role'), whereas for q m Ã the opposite is true. Hence a possible minimizer has to take care of relatively large lowest satisfactions in the ®rst case and of relatively small highest satisfactions in the second case.
A constant 0 which guarantees these results may depend on the cardinality of the player set N. We are going to present one possible candidate. Recall that a subset S 2
x is called balanced, if the set f1 j P Sg is balanced (see Section 2). It is well-known that every balanced S, which does not contain the empty coalition, is the union of its minimal balanced subcollections. The balancing coecients for a minimal balanced collection of coalitions are uniquely determined. Moreover, all minimal balanced collections of a ®nite set can be generated recursively w.r.t. the number of players as shown by Peleg (1965) . In view of this fact it is possible to compute bS maxfd ad j Y P Sg for every minimal balanced set S, where d PS are the balancing coecients of S.
Note that n bS, where the sum has to be taken over all minimal balanced collections S of coalitions of N, is completely determined by the cardinality n jxj. For a proof of this theorem the Appendix is referred to.
The modi®ed nucleolus as the unique minimizer of an inequality index
So far we have characterized two`classical' single valued members of the maximal satisfaction solution, namely the pre-and the antinucleolus. Common to M they satisfy AN, ETP, DES, COV, PO, SNPP, and REAS.
Unfortunately none of these single valued solutions satis®es self duality. The modi®ed nucleolus introduced by SudhoÈ lter (1996a, 1997) possesses all of the mentioned properties including SD. In what follows we brie¯y recall the de®nition and show that it is a member of the maximal satisfaction solution by directly proving that it maximizes a certain collective satisfaction function which reduces inequality. For every game x Y v the modi®ed nucleolus W v is the set of preimputations of v which lexicographically minimize the nonincreasingly ordered vector of excess dierences, i.e.
Wv fx P v j r x ! lex r y for y P vg 4X1
x . The modi®ed nucleolus satis®es SIVA. Let wv be the unique element of Wv. Moreover, W can be rede®ned by
where
The modi®ed nucleolus satis®es the above mentioned properties. For detailed proofs SudhoÈ lter (1996a, 1997) is referred to.
For every descending probability p P
where zx z x i À x j xx iYjPx P x 2 . Clearly p satis®es anonymity. The veri®cation of unanimity is straightforward and left to the reader. Moreover, p reduces inequality as shown in the following Lemma 4.1 For every descending probability p P n 2 the arising collective utility function p reduces inequality.
Proof. It is sucient (see Moulin (1988) ) to show that p satis®es the PigouDalton principle: p x b p y holds true for and any two vectors xY y P x with xx yxY x k y k for k P x nfiY jg and jx i À x j j`jy i À y j j, where iY j P x Y i T j are arbitrary.
Without loss of generality y i b y j can be assumed. Let be de®ned by x i y i À (i.e. x j y j is automatically true). Moreover, by anonymity we can assume that x i ! x j , thus b 0. For kY r P x nfiY jg we have
Therefore zx ! zyY zx T zy and, thus, the Pigou-Dalton principle is implied by decreasingness and positivity of p.
The induced inequality index coincides (up to normalization) with
because equation 4.3 can be rewritten as
In this sense we could callq p a dually weighted Gini index.
and observe thatp is a descending probability on f1Y
we obtain the following result. arg maxf xY v j x P Ã vg fwvg 4X6
Proof. By Lemma 1.5 and Theorem 2.10 Ã v can be replaced by every set of preimputations such that fx P v j x is reasonableg is satis®ed. As in Section 3 we can assume that v is chosen in such a way that fx P x j À1 x i 1Y i P xY xx 0g possesses the desired properties. More precisely, equation 4.6 is equivalent to arg max 2
and jSj ig
. Take a disjoint copy x Ã of x and de®ne the dual replication 
The observation that f i Y xY v`f i Y xY v holds true for i 1Y F F F Y 4 directly implies z 1 ! z 3 for every z P GxY v and z i b z 3 for some z P GxY v. Therefore x j P Mv by Remark 2.8.
(This means that x is a member of the convex hull of mY Y x e but it is not on the line segments connecting m and a or a and x e respectively (see Figure 4. 2).) This case can be treated analogously by ®rst de®ning coalitions i Y i by
and then observing f i Y xY v`f i Y xY v, thus z 2 ! z 3 for every z P GxY v and z 2 b z 3 for some z P GxY v.
In this case the Shapely value can be computed as u uv 7Y 3Y 1Y 1a12 and is, thus, a member of the maximal satisfaction solution.
Appendix
This section serves to prove Theorems 3.6 and 4.4. The following result is of technical nature and used in the sequel. The proof of Theorem 4.4 can be completed analogously to that of Theorem 3.6 by interchanging the roÃ les of`balancedness' by`m-balancedness',`prenucleolus' by`modi®ed nucleolus', and` p ' by` '.
